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Abstract: 
The patent-based pharmaceutical innovation system in the US does not 
incentivize the development of drugs with the greatest impact on patient or public 
health. It has also led to drug prices that patients and health care systems cannot 
afford. Three alternate approaches to promoting pharmaceutical innovation have 
been proposed to address these shortcomings. Delinkage models involve payments 
for drug innovation based on public health value rather than on a per-use basis. 
Public manufacturing models call upon governments and nonprofit organizations 
to lead drug discovery, development, and production. Public-private partnership 
models entail publicly-funded organizations working closely with for-profit 
partners on drug development and price-setting. Each model exhibits promise in 
promoting prescription drug innovation and access. This paper reviews these 
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Pharmaceutical innovation is critical for patient care and public health, as 
drugs can be among the most effective—and cost-effective—interventions that 
physicians can offer. However, drug development is also long and expensive. To 
attract private investment in this endeavor, the US federal government provides 
20-year patents and other long-lasting statutory market exclusivities that give 
companies time to earn back up-front investments and make profits.1 During this 
market exclusivity period, manufacturers can charge whatever they want, so US 
prices typically far exceed those for the same drugs sold in other high-income 
countries.2 
This innovation model has been criticized on two grounds. First, it does not 
incentivize the development of drugs with the greatest impact on patient or public 
health,3 but rather encourages private investment in drugs that are likely to generate 
the greatest revenues. As a result, despite being sold at high prices, many new 
drugs that receive US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval do not offer 
important advances in efficacy or safety. For example, among new drugs approved 
in 2017 in the US, about one-third were rated by expert organizations in Germany, 
France, and Canada to offer no or minor additional benefits over existing 
treatments.4 Another study found that 40% of the highest-spending brand-name 
drugs in Medicare were reformulations of previously approved active ingredients.5 
Second, the current pharmaceutical innovation model leads to prices of brand-
name drugs that patients and health care systems cannot afford. For example, when 
the direct-acting antiviral sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) was approved by the FDA in 2013, 
it offered for the first time the possibility of a cure for chronic hepatitis C virus 
infection, an infectious disease affecting 3-4 million US patients.6 But because 
Gilead priced the product at $84,000 for a standard 12-week course of therapy, 
payers like Medicaid were unable to offer it to all qualifying patients due to 
 
 1. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael S. Sinha & Jerry Avorn, Determinants of Market 
Exclusivity for Prescription Drugs in the United States, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1658, 1659 
(2017). 
 2. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of Prescription 
Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 860 (2016). 
 3. See Anna Kaltenboeck et al., Grounding Value‐Based Drug Pricing in Population Health, 
107 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 1290, 1291 (2020). 
 4. Richard G. Frank, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim. What Do High Drug Prices Buy Us? 
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (April 29, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20200424.131397/full/ [https://perma.cc/LZ2A-QUL4]. 
 5. Emily H. Jung, Ameet Sarpatwari & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Novelty of Active Ingredients in 
High-Cost Brand-Name Drugs, J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1, 1 (2020). 
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concerns that it would exceed their drug budgets.7 As a result, only 2.4% of eligible 
Medicaid patients were treated in the first year.8 Although prices of direct-acting 
antivirals have declined in recent years due to competition, they remain high, with 
many patients still unable to access treatment.9 The sofosbuvir case was 
particularly controversial because the drug emerged from years of publicly-funded 
research and development at Emory University, followed by work at a small 
company founded by academic scientists, before being transferred to Gilead for 
the final steps in development just a year before approval.10 
To promote the discovery of more innovative drugs like sofosbuvir while 
ensuring wider access after approval, three alternate models of drug development 
have been suggested: first, a “delinkage” model in which payment for drug 
innovation is made based on its public health value rather than on a per-use basis; 
second, a “public manufacturing” model, in which the government or nonprofit 
organizations fund the entire discovery and development process and then price 
drugs closer to the cost of production; and third, a “public-private partnership” 
model, in which a publicly-funded organization that discovers a new drug would 
transfer intellectual property to the private market, but remain closely involved in 
the drug development and price-setting process. 
Key values should guide assessment of these models. The current patent-based 
system has some strengths, including incentives that directly benefit innovators 
and timely invention disclosures. An ideal model would preserve these advantages, 
while encouraging greater needs-driven innovation, transparency, efficiency, and 
affordability. With these values in mind, we review delinkage, public 
manufacturing, and public-private partnership models in detail, examining their 
advantages and limitations. 
I. THE DELINKAGE MODEL 
While many variations of delinkage models exist, the term delinkage is often 
 
 7. See Soumitri Barua et al., Restrictions for Medicaid Reimbursement of Sofosbuvir for the 
Treatment of Hepatitis C Virus Infection in the United States, 163 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 215, 215 
(2015). 
 8. Joshua M. Liao & Michael A. Fischer, Restrictions of Hepatitis C Treatment for Substance-
Using Medicaid Patients: Cost Versus Ethics, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 893, 896 (2017). 
 9. See Ed Silverman, Most State Medicaid Programs Continue to Restrict Access to Hepatitis C 
Medicines, STAT (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2019/10/16/medicaid-
hepatitis-access-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/JVX9-28RG]. 
 10. Merrill Goozner, Why Sovaldi Shouldn’t Cost $84,000, MODERN HEALTHCARE (May 3, 
2014), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140503/MAGAZINE/305039983/why-
sovaldi-shouldn-t-cost-84-000 [https://perma.cc/9NXJ-REWU]; see also WILLIAM RICE & FRANK 
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used synonymously with “innovation inducement prizes” and “market entry 
rewards.”11 Conceptually, delinkage refers to the separation of an innovator’s 
research and development costs from the price of its products, which is achieved 
by rewarding the innovator directly for the innovation rather than indirectly 
through market exclusivity.12 In this manner, delinkage systems reduce or 
eliminate an innovator’s reliance on sales to recuperate research and development 
investments and earn profits.13 
Proponents of delinkage contend that it would benefit patients by lowering 
prices and increasing access to drugs.14 Some delinkage proposals require 
innovators to forfeit their patents in exchange for the rewards, allowing immediate 
generic entry to drive down drug prices.15 Other proposals allow innovators to 
retain their patents, but contractually obligate innovators to supply their drugs 
close to the marginal cost of production.16 
Delinkage also promotes innovation by ensuring the financial attractiveness 
of developing desired drugs. Rewards provide innovators with predictability, 
guaranteeing a return on investment upon meeting stated goals,17 which can be 
tailored to favor certain innovation outcomes, such as developing drugs for unmet 
needs.18 Even the pharmaceutical industry has acknowledged the benefits of 
delinking financial revenues from sales, given the mitigation of financial risk for 
both innovators and health care systems.19 Delinkage models could also increase 
the overall efficiency of the system by eliminating the need for substantial 
manufacturer spending on marketing efforts, which currently accounts for $30 
 
 11. See JAMES LOVE, UNITAID, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON DELINKING THE COST OF R&D 
FROM THE PRICE OF MEDICINES 1, 14 (2016), http://www.unitaid.org
/assets/Delinkage_Economic_Perspective_Feb2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ4X-PUT4]. 
 12. U.N. Secretary General and Co-Chairs of the High-Level Panel, Report of the United 
Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicine: Promoting Innovation and 
Access to Health Technologies (Sept. 2016) (defining delinkage), 
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/s/UNSG-HLP-Report-FINAL-12-Sept-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z4AK-5GDH]. 
 13. GREGORY W. DANIEL ET AL., DUKE MARGOLIS CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY, VALUE-BASED 
STRATEGIES FOR ENCOURAGING NEW DEVELOPMENT OF ANTIMICROBIAL DRUGS 7 (2017) [hereinafter 
Duke Margolis Report]. 
 14. LOVE, supra note 11, at 15. 
 15. See Kevin Outterson et al., Delinking Investment in Antibiotic Research and Development 
from Sales Revenues: The Challenges of Transforming a Promising Idea into Reality, 13 PLOS 
MEDICINE 1, 4 (2016). 
 16. See id. at 4–5. 
 17. John H. Rex & Kevin Outterson, Antibiotic Reimbursement in a Model Delinked from Sales: 
A Benchmark-based Worldwide Approach, 16(4) LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 500, 504 (2016). 
 18. LOVE, supra note 11, at 24. 
 19. Declaration by the Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology and Diagnostics Industries on 
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billion per year.20 
Finally, delinkage models are particularly beneficial for specific drugs, such 
as antibiotics, which require post-approval restrictions on use.21 In the current 
system, revenues are dependent on sales, encouraging innovators to maximize 
utilization during patent-protected periods, exacerbating the threat of antimicrobial 
resistance.22 
Critics of delinkage models point to the financial challenges of using 
nonmarket exclusivity rewards to incentivize research and development. Such 
rewards must be sufficiently large to offset the high risk of failure innovators bear 
to develop successful drugs. Governments may find it difficult to determine 
optimal reward pricing to achieve innovation, due to under- or over-valuation of 
research and development costs.23 For example, estimates of the reward needed to 
incentivize the development of an innovative antibiotic range from $919 million 
to $5 billion.24 Furthermore, governments would have to fund not only the rewards, 
but also the administrative costs to implement the schemes.25 The difficulty in 
funding such efforts is exemplified by the World Health Organization Global 
Observatory on research and development, established in 2013. Many of its 
projects, including a nano-based malaria drug delivery system, were ultimately 
cancelled due to underfunding.26 
Some innovators further argue that delinkage models are too risky and may 
not motivate appropriate actors. A one-time upfront payment for a promising drug 
may be a waste of resources if the drug is later determined to be less effective than 
originally predicted or to have safety issues that require it to be removed from the 
market. As FDA regulatory approval of new drugs has increasingly occurred based 
on less data and less rigorous study designs,27 the risk of such an outcome has 
increased. Additionally, pharmaceutical innovation often happens in multiple 
settings in parallel. If a prize is only awarded to a limited set of winners, multiple 
innovators may be discouraged from participating given uncertainty of being the 
 
 20. Lisa M. Schwartz & Steven Woloshin, Medical Marketing in the United States, 1997-2016, 
321 JAMA 80, 80 (2019). 
 21. David Holmes, Report Urges Controversial ‘Delinkage’ to Foster New Antibiotics, 20 
NATURE MED. 320, 320 (2014). 
 22. CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL BUSINESS MODEL FOR ANTIBIOTICS 
DELINKING REVENUES FROM SALES (Charles Clift et al. eds., 2015). 
 23. PHILIP STEVENS, DELINKED FROM REALITY 5 (Nov. 2017), https://geneva-network.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Delinkage.pdf [https://perma.cc/S99G-CSRW]. 
 24. Rex & Outterson, supra note 17, at 501. 
 25. See STEVENS, supra note 23, at 4; but see LOVE, supra note 11, at 22 (concluding that a 
delinkage approach to drug development would be Pareto efficient and would not result in 
deadweight loss). 
 26. STEVENS, supra note 23, at 11. 
 27. Jonathan J. Darrow, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, FDA Approval and Regulation of 
Pharmaceuticals, 1983-2018, 323 JAMA 164, 164 (2020). 
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first to the finish line.28 However, the second or third drug to enter the market in a 
class may offer important utility for patients.29 
Opposition to delinkage also stems from its centrally-planned nature that some 
commentators fear will result in “rent-seeking and crony capitalism.”30 According 
to this logic, a delinkage system that gives government officials discretion to direct 
drug development would be susceptible to regulatory capture by special interests 
as well as changing political and economic tides.31 To mitigate the effects of 
politicization, several delinkage proposals suggest entrusting the execution of 
reward schemes to neutral “pipeline coordinators” or well-established 
administrative agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH).32 
Finally, lack of international cooperation could be a barrier to successful 
deployment of delinkage models. The top-selling drugs in the world earn billions 
of dollars per year in revenue.33 Thus, the size of payments required to stimulate 
innovation may require global coordination, consensus, and priority alignment, 
which is challenging to accomplish.34 Some commentators have proposed that a 
core group of countries with high levels of clinical research activity could initially 
pilot a delinkage model,35 with a newly established secretariat or global 
organization charged with leading the effort.36 
A. Characteristics of Delinkage Models 
Several working groups and international organizations in the US and Europe 
have formulated proposed delinkage models (Table 1).37 The majority seek to 
incentivize development of new drugs to combat antimicrobial-resistant infections. 
However, some delinkage models outside of antibiotics have also been conceived, 
 
 28. CHANTAL MOREL, REACT, EXPLORING RESPONSES TO THE NEED FOR NEW ANTIBIOTICS: 
HOW DO DIFFERENT INCENTIVES COMPARE? 6 (2011). 
 29. See, e.g., Jing Luo et al., Effect of Generic Competition on Atorvastatin Prescribing and 
Patients’ Out-of-Pocket Spending, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1317, 1317 (2016). 
 30. STEVENS, supra note 23, at 8. 
 31. See MOREL, supra note 28, at 7. 
 32. See CHRISTINE ǺRDAL ET AL., DRIVE-AB, REVITALIZING THE ANTIBIOTIC PIPELINE: 
STIMULATING INNOVATION WHILE DRIVING SUSTAINABLE USE AND GLOBAL ACCESS 5 (2018) 
[hereinafter DRIVE-AB Report]; see also Improving Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, 
S. 771, 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter IAAPD Act]. 
 33. See IQVIA INSTITUTE, MEDICINE USE AND SPENDING IN THE U.S. (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.iqvia.com/insights/the-iqvia-institute/reports/medicine-use-and-spending-in-the-us-a-
review-of-2018-and-outlook-to-2023 [https://perma.cc/FG5X-ZR8P]. 
 34. See Kimberly Sciarretta et al., Economic Incentives for Antibacterial Drug Development: 
Literature Review and Considerations from the Transatlantic Task Force on Antimicrobial 
Resistance, 63 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1470, 1473 (2016). 
 35. See CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 31. 
 36. See id. 
 37. MOREL, supra note 28, at 7. 
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such as the Cancer Innovation Fund.38 In this section, we review the key 
characteristics of identified delinkage models. 
1. Drug Criteria 
Organizations charged with implementing delinkage programs must first 
establish guidance to innovators specifying what requirements drugs must meet to 
qualify for rewards, including clear efficacy and safety standards. These “target 
profile criteria” should be specific enough to provide innovators with predictability 
and should be fixed for several years to account for lengthy research and 
development times. However, they should also be flexible enough to incorporate 
unanticipated discoveries in the innovation process and periodically updated to 
reflect changing unmet needs.39 
For example, in the antibiotic context, groups such as Knowledge Ecology 
International, Chatham House, and DRIVE-AB recommend that target product 
profile design should be guided by assessing unmet public health needs for 
antibiotic innovation.40 Chatham House recommends that delinkage program 
administrators conduct comprehensive global threat assessments to identify 
incentive targets, similar to the antimicrobial resistance threat assessment 
conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 2013.41 
The CDC’s assessment used various criteria, including incidence and prevalence, 
clinical impact attributable to infection, economic impact, transmissibility, 
preventability through public health measures, and availability of effective 
treatment.42 Alternatively, DRIVE-AB suggests prioritizing antibiotic 
development based on existing lists, such as the World Health Organization’s list 
of priority pathogens.43 Target product profiles developed from these lists would 
ideally define specifications for safety and efficacy requirements, indications, 
dosing, treatment duration, and route of administration, which current proposals 
generally fail to do. 
2. Degree of Delinkage 
Delinkage models can be fully or partially delinked. In a fully delinked 
system, innovator profits are derived solely from reward payments, not sales.44 The 
 
 38. Cancer Innovation Fund (2017), https://imedproject.org/proposals-database/cif/ 
[https://perma.cc/4KZ5-PP42] (last visited Aug. 17, 2019). 
 39. DRIVE-AB Report, supra note 32, at 10. 
 40. See id.; CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 12. 
 41. CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 12. 
 42. See id. 
 43. DRIVE-AB Report, supra note 32, at 24. 
 44. See MATTHEW RENWICK, DAVID FINDLAY & SILAS HOLAND, AN APPROACH TO DESIGNING 
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drug is supplied at a price that reflects the marginal cost of production. By contrast, 
a partially delinked system awards innovators with smaller reward payments, and 
allows them to continue receiving revenue from sales, subject to negotiated price 
or quantity conditions.45 
The majority of delinkage proposals that we identified, including those by the 
Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, the Transatlantic Task Force on 
Antimicrobial Resistance, and the Norway Pilot Study, use partially rather than 
fully delinked models.46 Some commentators argue that partial delinkage is 
simpler to implement within existing reimbursement systems, minimizing 
disruptive market effects. Additionally, by retaining revenues from sales, 
innovators remain engaged in the lifecycle of their product. Partial delinkage may 
also be more feasible and sustainable for governments to implement, given the 
likely limited size of reward payments they could offer.47 The Boston Consulting 
Group recommends a slight variation of the partially delinked model—the 
“insurance mechanism”—which requires innovators to return a percentage of their 
profits up to the original amount of the market entry reward.48 However, full 
delinkage models would more effectively accomplish the goals of containing 
spending and promoting more equitable access by eliminating the innovator’s 
involvement in pricing and ability to profit through sales. 
3. Intellectual Property 
In delinkage models, innovators’ drug patents can be purchased outright, 
licensed, or retained.49 In a full patent buyout, the government purchases the 
innovators’ drug patents and then supplies the drug at prices close to marginal cost 
(or alternatively, licenses the intellectual property competitively to generic 
manufacturers). By contrast, in a partial patent buyout, innovators license their 
drug patents to the government in exchange for reward payments. The government 
is then able to establish market prices for those drugs. Finally, under marginal cost 
procurement contracts, innovators retain their intellectual property but supply the 
drug at contractually arranged prices. 
 
MARKET ENTRY REWARDS FOR STIMULATING ANTIBIOTIC DEVELOPMENT, DRIVE-AB (2017). 
 45. See id. 
 46. JIM O’NEILL, REVIEW ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE. SECURING NEW DRUGS FOR FUTURE 
GENERATIONS: THE PIPELINE OF ANTIBIOTICS 21 (2015); Christine Årdal et al., Pull Incentives for 
Antibacterial Drug Development: An Analysis by the Transatlantic Task Force on Antimicrobial 
Resistance, 65(8) CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1378, 1381 (2017) [hereinafter TATFAR Report]; 
Christine Årdal et al., Designing a Delinked Incentive for Critical Antibiotics: Lessons from Norway, 
46 J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 43, 47 (2018) [hereinafter Norway Pilot Study]. 
 47. Duke Margolis Report, supra note 13, at 8. 
 48. BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, BREAKING THROUGH THE WALL: A CALL FOR CONCERTED 
ACTION ON ANTIBIOTICS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 40 (2017). 
 49. See Outterson et al., supra note 15, at 5. 
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Thus, the critical component with any intellectual property scheme in a 
delinked system is that the rewards ultimately replace or eliminate market 
exclusivity. In comparing the schemes outlined above, the full patent buyout would 
require the government to offer substantially higher reward payments given the 
historical reluctance of pharmaceutical manufacturers to part with their intellectual 
property.50 
4. Payment Schedule 
Reward payments in delinkage models can be issued in various ways. One 
option is to pay the innovator an upfront lump sum payment shortly following 
market approval. However, such payments carry high risk because evidence of 
clinical value may be insufficient at the time of approval, especially for drugs 
approved based on changes in biomarkers or other unproven surrogate endpoints 
rather than clinically meaningful effects.51 
Another option is milestone payments, awarded to innovators upon meeting 
key goals during development or following market approval. Upstream payments 
during development are highly valuable to innovators investing in large clinical 
trials but pose risk to funders.52 Outterson et al. recommend a staged approach, in 
which a base reward is granted upon drug approval, with subsequent annual 
payments awarded based on evaluation of effectiveness data collected in the course 
of usual care.53 The annual payments would aid the innovator in financing 
manufacturing and supply-chain availability. Rex et al. and the Duke Margolis 
Center propose a similar scheme that would award innovators with increases to 
each “benchmark payment” based on desirable factors, such as proof of a novel 
mechanism of action, addressing serious unmet needs, reducing health care costs, 
targeting resistant pathogens, or label expansions to other indications.54 
5. Reward Obligations 
Delinkage models can also include additional obligations for manufacturers 
in exchange for reward payouts. Examples include guaranteed supply of drugs and 
open-source information sharing of clinical data.55 To combat overuse, delinkage 
models for antibiotics can include conditions on marketing and promotion.56 For 
example, the Improving Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, proposed in 
 
 50. See MOREL, supra note 28, at 8. 
 51. See Sciarretta et al., supra note 34, at 1472. 
 52. See CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4. 
 53. Outterson et al., supra note 15, at 4. 
 54. Rex & Outterson, supra note 17, at 502; Duke Margolis Report, supra note 13, at 12. 
 55. See LOVE, supra note 11, at 48. 
 56. See Outterson et al., supra note 15, at 5. 
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Congress in 2017, would have established an Antibiotic Prize Fund offering prizes 
conditional on waiver of patent rights, reasonable pricing, reports of marketing 
activity, and data disclosures.57 
6. Reward Size 
A main challenge for delinkage model implementation is determining the 
magnitude of payments necessary to attract interest from private investors and for-
profit companies. The payments must be large enough to motivate companies to 
participate but feasible for governments to finance. Proposals suggest that reward 
size could be estimated based on standard health technology assessments, social 
value of the subject of the prize fund to health systems, or general global market 
demand.58 The BEAM Alliance, a network of European biopharmaceutical 
companies, issued a statement that innovators would be more willing to participate 
in delinkage schemes if the reward amount “ultimately allows a fair redistribution 
to those who innovated and took the initial risk to bring the science through early 
and clinical stages.”59 
The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology report, the 
United Kingdom’s Antimicrobial Resistance review, and the DRIVE-AB report all 
estimate that prizes in the range of $1 billion (in addition to sales) would be 
required in the antibiotic market.60 It was estimated that a reward of this amount 
could quadruple the number of novel antibiotics over the next 30 years.61 
Although such prizes may be costly upfront, delinkage systems could 
ultimately lead to substantial savings for health care systems by reducing or 
eliminating premiums normally imposed by innovators on drugs. For example, an 
analysis of Senator Bernie Sanders’ (I-VT) proposed Medical Innovation Prize 
Fund, which would allocate 0.55% of US GDP to reward health outcomes in a 
delinked model, estimated that it would have saved $92 billion in 2016.62 
Additionally, increased availability and access to novel drugs could—if 
effective—lower total health care costs by preventing costlier downstream use of 
health care resources. 
 
 57. IAAPD Act, supra note 32, at 77. 
 58. See Outterson et al., supra note 15, at 4. 
 59. BEAM ALLIANCE, KEY GUIDELINES TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE MEASURES TOWARD SMES 
TO REVIVE THE ANTIBACTERIAL R&D FIELD 14 (2017). 
 60. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT ON COMBATING ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE 6 (2014) [hereinafter PCAST Report]; O’Neill, 
supra note 46, at 20; DRIVE-AB Report, supra note 32, at 6. 
 61. DRIVE-AB Report, supra note 32, at 6. 
 62. Savings, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (2018), https://delinkage.org/savings/ 
[https://perma.cc/F5YL-KATW] (last visited Aug. 13, 2019). 
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7. Funding Sources 
Given the substantial resources needed to finance a delinkage model, 
commentators have suggested a broad range of potential funding sources. The most 
commonly cited are government health care budgets and higher insurance 
premiums.63 Several proposals recommend the creation of international funds 
supported by contributions from multiple countries.64 According to one estimate, 
between $4 and $5 billion could be raised if Organization for Economic 
Cooperation countries each contributed 0.01% of their GDPs.65 Taxes could be 
imposed on certain prescriptions (e.g., a usage fee on all antibiotics to fund a 
reward pool for novel antibiotic drugs).66 Finally, a competitive financing scheme 
has also been proposed in which individuals and employers would be required to 
contribute to pooled research and development funds managed by investment 
intermediaries.67 
B. Outcomes from Delinkage Models 
Despite numerous proposals, there has been no large-scale implementation of 
delinkage models for drug development (Table 2).68 However, several smaller, 
targeted prize competitions have launched. For example, the Longitude Prize, 
established in the United Kingdom in 2014, offers a £10 million prize fund for an 
accurate and affordable rapid point-of-care diagnostic test that would conserve 
antibiotic use.69 No one has won it. Other biomedical prize competitions include 
the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative Challenge (protein research), the TB 
Alliance Challenge (drug production), the Archon Genomics X Prize (genome 
sequencing), and the CASP Prize (protein structure prediction).70 
 
 63. See CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 7. 
 64. See id. at 16. 
 65. See Outterson et al., supra note 15, at 2–3. 
 66. See PCAST Report, supra note 60, at 41. 
 67. Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, 2 
PLOS BIOLOGY 147, 150 (2004). 
 68. See MOREL, supra note 28, at 7. 
 69. LONGITUDE PRIZE, https://longitudeprize.org/ [https://perma.cc/E5DY-G6QK] (last visited 
Aug. 13, 2019). 
 70. See IAVI Posts $150,000 Challenge on InnoCentive, INTERNATIONAL AIDS VACCINE 
INITIATIVE (Dec. 17, 2008), https://www.iavi.org/news-resources/press-releases/2008/iavi-posts-
150-000-challenge-on-innocentive [https://perma.cc/XCE8-YU2Y]; A Global Effort to Reduce the 
Costs of a TB Drug Candidate, TB ALLIANCE (Nov. 6, 2008), 
https://www.tballiance.org/news/global-effort-reduce-costs-tb-drug-candidate 
[https://perma.cc/5PLV-SGG7]; Peter Diamandis, Outpaced by Innovation: Canceling an XPRIZE, 
HUFFPOST (Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/outpaced-by-innovation-ca_b_3795710 
[https://perma.cc/S7PH-TKFV]; Robert F. Service, Google’s DeepMind Aces Protein Folding, 
SCIENCE MAGAZINE (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/12/google-s-deepmind-
aces-protein-folding [https://perma.cc/48H7-JAXM]. 
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The closest mechanisms to large-scale drug development delinkage models 
that have been implemented are advanced market commitments, which involve 
contracting ahead of time to buy products meeting specified conditions.71 The 
guaranteed purchase order is the prize. In 2007, with support from five countries 
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the GAVI alliance established a $1.5 
billion advanced market commitment fund to subsidize purchases of qualified 
pneumococcal vaccines in developing countries.72 However, the fund was later 
criticized for having minimal influence on innovation, since manufacturers had 
already developed the vaccines prior to program implementation.73 Another 
advanced market commitment is guaranteed volume purchases of childhood 
vaccines that the US government offers to ensure a stable supply of products that 
have vital importance to public health.74 
Delinkage-like models have been implemented in other sectors, including the 
defense, electric utility, and academic publishing industries.75 A McKinsey study 
found an increase in innovation prize competitions in recent decades, noting a shift 
to providing incentives for specific rather than broad categories of innovation.76 
Among them are the X Prizes, a series of philanthropically-funded contests started 
by Peter Diamandis in 1995. The Ansari X Prize, the first such prize, offered a $10 
million reward for the development of a spacecraft capable of carrying three people 
into space twice within ten days.77 The first-place team spent more than $20 million 
to develop their winning spacecraft, while total spending by all competing teams 
exceeded $100 million.78 Although the competition was successful in generating 
publicity for the sector, the large investment-to-prize ratio highlighted the 
challenge of prize tailoring. By contrast, the Ashoka’s Changemakers 
competitions, a series of contests focused on various social issues, awards smaller 
 
 71. Kevin Outterson & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Market-Based Licensing for HPV Vaccines in 
Developing Countries, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 130, 132 (2008). 
 72. About the Pneumococcal Vaccine, GAVI: The Vaccine Alliance, 
https://www.gavi.org/investing/innovative-financing/pneumococcal-amc/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/8DHR-BWUV] (last visited Aug. 13, 2019). 
 73. See, e.g., Jens Plahte, Is the Pneumococcal Vaccine Advance Market Commitment 
Motivating Innovation and Increasing Manufacturing Capacity? Some Preliminary Answers, 30 
VACCINE 2462, 2462 (2012). 
 74. See Alan R. Hinman, Walter A. Orenstein & Lance Rodewald, Financing Immunizations 
in the United States, 38 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1440, 1440 (2004). 
 75. See CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 9. 
 76. Jonathan Bays, Tony Goland & Joe Newsum, Using Prizes to Spur Innovation, MCKINSEY 
& CO. (July 2009), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-
finance/our-insights/using-prizes-to-spur-innovation [https://perma.cc/3GRA-SW7L]. 
 77. Launching a New Space Industry, https://www.xprize.org/prizes/ansari 
[https://perma.cc/MWF9-TZHB] (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 
 78. William A. Masters & Benoit Delbecq, Accelerating Innovation with Prize Rewards, INT’L 
FOOD POL’Y RES. INST. 8 (Dec. 2008). 
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prize amounts (around $5,000).79 The competition has been successful in fostering 
collaboration among competitors in online forums, resulting in the generation of 
novel ideas.80 
In general, commentators note that critical characteristics of effective prize 
competitions are clear and measurable objectives, a credible guarantee of payment, 
and impartial judges.81 Typical shortcomings include a lack of incentives for 
improvements above a certain threshold and the failure of sponsors to evaluate the 
impact of prizes on innovation and development.82 
C. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The first steps in implementing a delinkage model for drug development 
would be to create a prioritization scheme and a well-defined target product profile. 
Other important details that must be worked out include: 
 Defining model elements (e.g., full or partial delinkage, lump sum or 
milestone payments) that can gain consensus across government and industry 
stakeholders. 
 Determining innovation-incentive prizes or market entry rewards large 
enough to affect new drug development. 
 Identifying a suitable authority to coordinate and implement an 
international delinkage model. 
Some drug manufacturers have already demonstrated their opposition to 
delinkage concepts and studies.83 In response, several reports recommend that 
delinkage models remain voluntary, such that manufacturers can either opt-in to 
receive reward payments or retain their intellectual property rights.84 However, it 
is unknown whether a delinkage reward model could coexist within the current 
patent-based system. 
Since existing delinkage model proposals have predominantly targeted 
antimicrobial resistance, implementing a delinkage model for antibiotic 
development initially would be a logical start. Other possible early targets for such 
 
 79. ASHOKA CHANGEMAKERS, https://www.ashoka.org/en-us/program/ashoka-changemakers 
[https://perma.cc/K7BA-3XN5] (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 
 80. See Bays, Goland & Newsum, supra note 76. 
 81. See id.; Masters & Delbecq, supra note 78, at 9. 
 82. See Bays, Goland & Newsum, supra note 76; Masters & Delbecq, supra note 78, at 10. 
 83. Catherine Saez, Draft Cancer Resolution Might Be Set For Approval At World Health 
Assembly, INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH (May 19, 2017), https://www.ip-
watch.org/2017/05/19/draft-cancer-resolution-might-set-approval-world-health-assembly/ 
[https://perma.cc/W4EK-Y76K] (reporting that drug companies were able to block a feasibility study 
of delinkage in a cancer prevention resolution). 
 84. Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 
J. LAW & ECON. 525, 525 (2001). 
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models are tropical diseases, which are highly prevalent in low-income countries 
and thus do not attract a lot of investment from international for-profit 
manufacturers. After collecting data and evaluating the outcomes from these 
models, delinkage could then be expanded to other therapeutic areas of unmet 
need. Smaller pilot studies of delinkage models could eventually lead to an 
alternative system to the current patent-based model of drug development. 
 






A partially delinked model that awards $1 billion to cover 
research and development costs but continues to allow 
innovators to sell their drug for profit. Payment is 
conditional upon stewardship and global access. 
BEAM Alliance 
Position Paper 
A partially delinked “calibrated” model that awards 
innovators with payments to supplement value-based 
payments from payers. Prizes are based on flexible target 
product profiles and awarded for various milestones, even 




A partially delinked model that awards $1 billion to 
antibiotics meeting predefined target product profiles, paid 
in installments over eight years after approval. Recipients 
return 30% of their profits (up to $1 billion). Payments are 
conditional on access, quality, and stewardship conditions. 
Cancer 
Innovation Fund 
A series research and development incentive models, 
including milestone prizes, end-product prizes, and open 
source dividends. Once a qualified product obtains 
approval, a panel awards prizes to entities for having 




Rewards offered to antibiotics prioritized by global threat 
assessments. Financial participation begins among a core 
group of countries, coordinated by an international 
secretariat to manage pooled funding. The secretariat enters 
contracts, acquires full intellectual property rights, or 
establishes licenses with innovators. 
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An agreement among stakeholders in the pharmaceutical 
industry to support delinkage models that reduce the link 
between revenues and sales and mitigate financial risk for 
innovators and health systems. 
DRIVE-AB 
Report 
A partially delinked model that awards $1 billion to 
antibiotics meeting predefined target product profiles, paid 
in installments over five years after approval. Payments are 




A partially delinked model that awards prizes to qualified 
antibiotics for the first few years following market 
approval. By the fifth- or sixth-year, funding is transitioned 
to value-based contracts with payers. Initial payments are 
conditional upon innovators demonstrating an increasing 







A $2 billion antibiotics prize fund that awards monetary 
prizes to innovators with qualified antibiotics based on 
criteria established by the NIH Director. Prizes are 
conditional upon waived patent rights, reasonable prices, 
marketing reports, and data disclosures. 
Life Prize An open collaborative research and development 
framework aimed to create an affordable, short-course 
treatment regimen effective against all forms of 
tuberculosis. Prizes are awarded to drugs in clinical trials 
that fulfill predefined criteria, including data and 




A prize fund equal to 0.55% of gross domestic product 
overseen by a Board of Trustees, which awards companies 
for certain drug approvals or interim milestones. The fund 
is funded by a fee on health insurers. 
Norway Pilot 
Study 
A partially delinked model that awards innovators “top-up 
payments” to supplement revenues from sales. Pilot study 
researchers determined that a partial delinkage model 
would be simpler to adapt to existing systems than a full 
delinkage model. 
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OECD Report A comprehensive approach for incentivizing antibiotic 
development using various delinkage mechanisms, 
including monetary prizes, milestone prizes, and full patent 
buyouts for successfully developed products. 
Outterson et al. A delinked incentive framework involving marginal cost 
procurement contracts, partial buyout, or full buyout of an 
innovator’s intellectual property. Payments are conditional 
upon rational use (e.g., no overmarketing or overselling). 
PCAST Report A fund that provides advance market commitments and 
milestone payments to incentivize antibiotic development. 
The government provides incentive payments of about 
$400 million per drug. 
Rex et al. A fully delinked model that awards $1 billion awarded to 
qualified antibiotics, paid in benchmark payments of $200 
million per year over 5 years. Five conditions could 
increase benchmark payments: novel mechanism of action, 
addressing unmet medical needs, reducing health care 
costs, targeting priority resistant pathogens, and post-
approval label changes to expand indications. 
TATFAR 
Report 
A partially delinked “market-priced” model that awards 
innovators with small reward payments (~$500 million) to 
complement revenues from unit sales. Payments are 
conditional upon sustainable use and access stipulations. 
 






A $10 million prize awarded to “the first team to rapidly, 
accurately and economically sequence 100 whole human 
genomes to an unprecedented level of accuracy.” The 
competition was later cancelled as it was “outpaced by 
innovation.” 
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CASP Prize A competition for protein structure prediction occurs every 
two years. In December 2018, Google subsidiary 





IAVI and InnoCentive offered a $150,000 prize to the first 
researcher to design and create a mimic of a stable 
functional HIV envelope protein to aid in HIV vaccine 
development. Despite more than 300 responses, no 
submissions met the challenge requirements. 
Longitude 
Prize 
A £10 million prize fund (£8 million payout) for an accurate 
and affordable rapid point-of-care diagnostic test that 
conserves antibiotic use. The first team to be selected by the 
Longitude Committee by 2020 wins the prize. 
TB Alliance The TB Alliance, InnoCentive, and the Rockefeller 
Foundation awarded two winning teams $20,000 each for 
developing a simpler and safer method of producing a 
tuberculosis drug candidate PA-824. 
II. THE PUBLIC MANUFACTURING MODEL 
Public manufacturing refers to the development and production of drugs by 
(or on behalf of) a government or nonprofit entity.85 The public manufacturing 
model is a clear departure from the current pharmaceutical system, with a primary 
focus on patient and public health needs rather than profits. 
The public sector is critical to pharmaceutical innovation. The US government 
is the largest single funder of basic and translational science in the world, with a 
budget of about $39 billion in 2019.86 In addition, numerous nonprofits support 
drug discovery and development.87 But government and nonprofit investment has 
traditionally focused on early-stage investigations, with intellectual property often 
transferred to the private sector for later-stage clinical testing, and nearly always 
for production and dissemination of approved drug products. In leading 
conceptions, a public manufacturer would maintain control over drug 
 
 85. See Dan Liljenquist, Ge Bai & Gerard F. Anderson, Addressing Generic-Drug Market 
Failures — The Case for Establishing a Nonprofit Manufacturer, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1857, 1858 
(2018). 
 86. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH): 
BACKGROUND AND CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES 2 (Apr. 19, 2019), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41705 [https://perma.cc/QPF4-EPL6]. 
 87. Rahul Nayak, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Public Sector Financial Support for 
Late Stage Discovery of New Drugs in the United States: Cohort Study, 367 BMJ 1, 8 (2019). 
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development, testing, and production for widespread use, enabling the sale of 
medications at more affordable prices than could be expected of for-profit 
manufacturers. Such a model could help advance innovation in key areas of 
medical need that have been neglected or abandoned by the for-profit sector.88 For 
example, in 2019, Amgen joined several other large pharmaceutical companies in 
reducing research and development investments in central nervous system drugs.89 
Public manufacturing has also been proposed in two production contexts: 
addressing market failures and drug shortages.90 One example of a market at risk 
of failure is essential off-patent medicines supplied by small numbers of 
manufacturers. In such circumstances, due to the lack of competition, 
manufacturers have been able to increase prices, sometimes by shocking amounts. 
A highly publicized case of such price gouging was Turing Pharmaceuticals’ over 
5,000% markup of the antiparasitic drug pyrimethamine (Daraprim).91 Another 
example was Valeant Pharmaceuticals’ price increase of penicillamine and 
trientine, treatments for a rare condition affecting the ability to process copper.92 
These price hikes have made drugs prohibitively expensive for patients. 
Facilitating public manufacturing of such products would prevent pharmaceutical 
manufacturers like Turing and Valeant from cornering a market.93 Overall, one-
third or more of off-patent drugs may be supplied by three or fewer manufacturers 
and may be at risk for such market failures.94 
Generic drugs that are supplied by a limited set of manufacturers can also 
increase the risk of shortages. Recently, sterile intravenous medications used by 
hospitals—including sodium bicarbonate, injectable morphine, and sodium 
nitroprusside—suffered shortages in part due to natural disasters in Puerto Rico, a 
 
 88. Szymon Jarosławski & Mondher Toumi, Non-profit Drug Research and Development: The 
Case Study of Genethon, 7 J. OF MKT. ACCESS & HEALTH POL’Y 1, 1 (2018); Ameet Sarpatwari, Dana 
Brown & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Development of a National Public Pharmaceutical Research and 
Development Institute, 48 J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 225, 225 (2020). 
 89. Andrew Dunn, Amgen Exits Neuroscience R&D as Pharma Pulls Back from Field, 
BIOPHARMA DIVE (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/amgen-exits-
neuroscience-rd-as-pharma-pulls-back-from-field/566157/ [https://perma.cc/EV8C-Q96U]. 
 90. See Reed Abelson & Katie Thomas, Fed Up With Drug Companies, Hospitals Decide to 
Start Their Own, N.Y. TIMES (January 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/health/drug-
prices-hospitals.html [https://perma.cc/86HH-SC5M]. 
 91. Jing Luo, Ameet Sarpatwari & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Regulatory Solutions to the Problem 
of High Generic Drug Costs, 2(4) OPEN FORUM INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1, 1 (2015). 
 92. See Melody Petersen, How 4 Drug Companies Rapidly Raises Prices on Life-Saving 
Drugs, L.A. TIMES (December 21, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-senate-drug-price-
study-20161221-story.html. 
 93. See Liljenquist, Bai & Anderson, supra note 85, at 1859. 
 94. Ravi Gupta et al., Generic Drug Approvals Since the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, 176 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 1391, 1391 (Sept. 2016); see also Ernst. R. Berndt, Rena M. Conti & Stephen J. 
Murphy, The Landscape of U.S. Prescription Drug Markets, 2004-2016, NBER Working Paper # 
23640 (2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23640 [https://perma.cc/66KF-NT6E]. 
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major manufacturing location for such products.95 Public manufacturing can help 
address this issue by providing hospitals with a more diverse supply of needed 
medications. By relying on manufacturers that are not profit-incentivized, the risk 
of unexpected price spikes would be minimized. 
Although promising, the public manufacturing model, faces several 
challenges. Commentators have highlighted concerns over financing, particularly 
given the high manufacturing costs of certain therapeutics, such as biologics,96 and 
the possibility of private companies undermining public manufacturers by 
reducing the price of their products upon the approval of competing 
products.97Additionally, public manufacturers may lack the resources and 
expertise to launch, produce, and distribute drugs at an efficient scale. Critics of 
the public manufacturing model have suggested that this may compound problems 
with drug access, diverting resources to building new public organizations instead 
of supporting established pathways.98 Finally, at least one review raised concerns 
that public manufacturing could have the unintended consequence of stifling 
innovation,99 arguing that if a public entity were to market a product at a low price, 
it could undercut the potential revenue for new products, which could result in the 
abandonment of investigational products targeting the same disease or therapeutic 
area. 
A. Characteristics of Public and Nonprofit Manufacturing Models 
The public manufacturing model is a relatively new concept for drugs. The 
Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, proposed by Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-
MA) in 2018, was one of the first proposals in the US for a government authority 
to manufacture generic drugs (Table 3). Other nonprofit companies in the US and 
Europe have launched in recent years, devoted to transforming parts of the 
prescription drug market (Table 4). 
1. Intended Purpose 
Existing public manufacturers can be divided into two groups: those dedicated 
to innovative drug development and those to affordable generic supply. Genethon, 
the Institute for OneWorld Health, and the Institute for Pediatric Innovation are 
 
 95. Alison Kodjak, Hospitals Prepare To Launch Their Own Drug Company To Fight High 
Prices And Shortages, NPR (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.opb.org/news/article/npr-hospitals-prepare-
to-launch-their-own-drug-company-to-fight-high-prices-and-shortages/ [https://perma.cc/6XKZ-
YVE7]. 
 96. Jarosławski & Toumi, supra note 88, at 3. 
 97. Liljenquist, Bai & Anderson, supra note 85, at 1857. 
 98. Szymon Jarosławski et al., Non-Profit Drug Research and Development at a Crossroads, 
35 PHARMACEUTICAL RES. 1, 3 (2018). 
 99. Jarosławski & Toumi, supra note 88, at 3. 
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examples of nonprofit companies aimed at drug development in areas that have 
been neglected by the private sector. These nonprofits conduct similar activities as 
their private counterparts—including building in-house research teams, designing 
clinical trial protocols, managing research timelines, and guiding products through 
regulatory review—but have a public-oriented mission to provide their products 
close to marginal cost.100 
Other public manufacturers are dedicated to producing low-cost generic 
versions of drugs with expired patents. The most prominent example is Civica Rx, 
which launched in September 2018 as a nonprofit devoted to bringing stability to 
the hospital supply chain by manufacturing common generic drugs.101 
2. Drug Criteria 
Public manufacturers must decide which products to prioritize. Some 
nonprofits have a dedicated disease area upon formation, such as Genethon’s focus 
on rare conditions or the Institute for OneWorld Health’s focus on tropical 
diseases.102 
The nonprofit Civica Rx allows its hospital and health care system partners to 
prioritize which medications it manufactures. Its focus has been on stabilizing the 
pharmaceutical supply chain by supplying common hospital-administered generic 
drugs that have undergone price hikes or have drug shortages.103 In October 2019, 
the nonprofit delivered its first manufactured drug, an injectable formulation of the 
antibiotic vancomycin, to a hospital facility in Utah.104 Since then, Civica Rx has 
entered several partnerships with suppliers and health systems, including with 
Hikma Pharmaceuticals to provide 14 hospital drugs used in emergency care, 
surgery, pain, and hypertension;105 with Thermo Fisher to develop nine drugs used 
 
 100. Victoria G. Hale, Katherine Woo & Helene Levens Lipton, Oxymoron No More: The 
Potential of Nonprofit Drug Companies to Deliver on the Promise of Medicines for the Developing 
World, 24(4) HEALTH AFF. 1057, 1059 (2005). 
 101. CIVICA RX, https://civicarx.org/ [https://perma.cc/28PD-8EV7]. 
 102. See GENETHON, https://www.genethon.fr/en/ [https://perma.cc/YW6T-RWVL]; INSTITUTE 
FOR ONEWORLD HEALTH, http://skoll.org/organization/institute-for-one-world-health/ 
[https://perma.cc/X4XR-8FVM]. 
 103. Eric Palmer, Hospital-backed Civica Rx Nabs Amgen Veteran as CEO and Targets 14 
Drugs to Knock Off, FIERCEPHARMA (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.fiercepharma.com/manufacturing 
/hospital-supported-civica-rx-to-produce-14-drugs-are-chronic-shortage [https://perma.cc/YR93-
4HM8]. 
 104. Samantha Liss, After Much Fanfare, Civica Rx Delivers Its 1st Drugs, HEALTHCARE DIVE 
(Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/after-much-fanfare-civica-rx-delivers-its-1st-
drugs/564189/ [https://perma.cc/C7MN-3HG7]. 
 105. Press Release, PRNewswire, Hikma and Civica Rx Sign Long-term Agreement to Reduce 
Generic Drug Shortages in the US (July 23, 2019), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/hikma-and-civica-rx-sign-long-term-agreement-to-reduce-generic-drug-shortages-in-the-
us-300889068.html [https://perma.cc/9V6Y-BNE6] [hereinafter Hikma Press Release]. 
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in critical or emergency care;106 and with Blue Cross Blue Shield companies to 
create a new subsidiary devoted to lowering prices for high-cost generic drugs.107 
Proposals have called for government manufacturers to prioritize drugs with 
supply shortages or price hikes.108 The Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act would 
establish an Office of Drug Manufacturing authorized to manufacture (or contract 
for the manufacture of) generic drugs under three listed conditions: that no 
company is manufacturing the drug; that fewer than three companies produce the 
drug and that the price has spiked or the drug is in shortage; or that fewer than 
three companies produce the drug, that the price is a barrier to patient access, and 
that the drug is listed as an “essential medicine” by the World Health 
Organization.109 
3. Manufacturing Control 
Another variable in public manufacturing models is the degree of control 
public manufacturers exert over product development, production, and 
distribution. Given resource and expertise constraints, some nonprofits rely on 
outsourcing to contract organizations.110 For example, Civica Rx has stated that 
while its goal is to manufacture its own generic drugs, the company has initially 
relied on third-party manufacturers, such as Hikma Pharmaceuticals and Thermo 
Fisher,111 while developing its own capabilities.112 
Other nonprofit companies have chosen to sell their research programs to 
private developers. For example, the US Cystic Fibrosis Foundation developed a 
drug candidate and later sold it to a private company, which launched the product 
with a high annual price of $300,000.113 Genethon also entered into exclusive 
licensing agreements with private biotechnology companies (e.g., AveXis, Spark 
Therapeutics) for several research programs.114 Although this model expedites 
 
 106. Jonathan Gardner, Civica Advances Drug Supply Strategy with Thermo Fisher Deal, 
BIOPHARMA DIVE (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/civica-thermo-fisher-
partner-drug-shortage-manufacturing/570617/ [https://perma.cc/4PBN-NSW9]. 
 107. Press Release, Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Companies 
Join Forces with Civica Rx to Lower Costs of Select High-Cost Generic Medications (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.bcbs.com/press-releases/blue-cross-and-blue-shield-companies-join-forces-civica-rx-
lower-costs-of-select [https://perma.cc/3PAE-3EBG] [hereinafter Blue Cross Blue Shield Release]. 
 108. Meredith Betz, The New Nonprofit Pharmaceutical World: What’s Up with That?, 
NONPROFIT Q. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/the-new-nonprofit-pharmaceutical-
world-whats-up-with-that/ [https://perma.cc/RZ8Y-2BYA]. 
 109. Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, S.3775, 115th Cong. (2018) [hereinafter ADM Act]. 
 110. Rena M. Conti, David O. Meltzer & Mark J Ratain, Nonprofit Biomedical Companies, 
84(2) CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY THERAPEUTICS 194, 197 (2008). 
 111. Hikma Press Release, supra note 105; Gardner, supra note 106. 
 112. Abelson & Thomas, supra note 90. 
 113. Jarosławski et al., supra note 98, at 2. 
 114. Jarosławski & Toumi, supra note 88, at 2. 
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clinical development, it also leads to ethical tensions. Commentators have noted 
that royalties returned to the nonprofit or government entity can be reinvested to 
support further research efforts. But while such reinvestment may be beneficial, 
high market prices limit patient access, which may be a core principle of the 
organization.115 This may be why Genethon has since announced its intentions to 
internalize its entire production chain, from discovery to manufacturing, enabling 
the organization to “fully recoup the public funds invested into research, and offer 
its products at affordable prices.”116 Such internalization is risky but can more 
reliably ensure fair market prices. 
4. Governance 
Public manufacturers should operate in ways that align with the core mission 
of promoting public health, which may require using different governance 
structures than private companies. Requiring philanthropic donors and major drug 
purchasers (e.g., hospital executives) to serve on the boards of nonprofit 
pharmaceutical companies would help ensure public accountability, given their 
financial interest in keeping drug prices low.117 Civica Rx’s Board of Advisors, for 
example, is comprised of several hospital directors, and their CEO is reportedly 
serving without compensation.118 By contrast, Harm Reduction Therapeutics, a 
nonprofit company devoted to developing a generic alternative to naloxone 
(Narcan), is led by a team comprised of former pharmaceutical executives119 and 
was primarily launched with a $3.4 million grant from Purdue Pharma, a 
pharmaceutical company at the center of US growth in opioid sales.120 This latter 
type of arrangement could lead to conflicts of interest, emphasizing the importance 
of transparency and autonomy. 
5. Purchasing Agreements 
One of the primary challenges facing public manufacturers is competing for 
market share with private companies that already have monopolies or broad market 
power. Private companies can use their control over distribution channels or 
market share to shut out competitors.121 These responses could be extreme enough 
 
 115. See id. 
 116. Jarosławski et al., supra note 98, at 3. 
 117. Liljenquist, Bai & Anderson, supra note 85, at 1858. 
 118. Marc Harrison, How the Not-For-Profit Civica Rx Will Disrupt the Generic Drug Industry, 
STAT (March 14, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/03/14/how-civica-rx-will-disrupt-generic-
drug-industry/ [https://perma.cc/2MUF-SHK5]. 
 119. HARM REDUCTION THERAPEUTICS, https://www.harmreductiontherapeutics.org/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3TR5-U8NC]. 
 120. Betz, supra note 110. 
 121. Kodjak, supra note 95. 
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to spur antitrust action122 but can also be addressed with long-term purchasing 
contracts. Civica Rx developed a model to commit hospitals and other drug 
purchasers to contracts for the purchase of generics at pre-determined low 
prices.123 An initial proposal suggested that purchasers would have to commit 50% 
of their annual purchases to Civica Rx at an established price for at least five 
years.124 In January 2020, Blue Cross Blue Shield companies provided an initial 
$55 million to create a Civica Rx subsidiary dedicated to developing generic drugs 
currently identified as high cost, with the first drugs expected to be available by 
2022.125 
6. Intellectual Property 
Questions remain about how public manufacturers should handle intellectual 
property, both their own and those held by other companies. Should public 
manufacturers seeking to develop novel products pursue patents, and if so, what 
should they do with them? Nonprofit and state-run entities could seek patents to 
protect their inventions from private companies but make the patents available 
through patent pools subject to “copyleft”-like licenses that ensure their free use.126 
Such pools collect patent rights across multiple patent holders, making them 
available to third parties through nonexclusive licenses. The first patent pool in the 
public health space was UNITAID’s Medicines Patent Pool established in 2010, 
which improved access to treatments for HIV, hepatitis C, and tuberculosis in low- 
and middle-income countries.127 Patent pools, however, have been criticized for 
resulting in anticompetitive licensing practices or collusion among patent pool 
members.128 To address this, public manufacturers should work with partners to 
ensure patent pool policies and rules are explicitly designed to encourage licensing 
and prevent fraud or abuse, thus facilitating uptake of licensed drug products.129 
 
 122. See, e.g., Gianna Melillo, NY Attorney General, Federal Trade Commission Sue Martin 
Shkreli, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.ajmc.com/newsroom/ny-attorney-
general-federal-trade-commission-sue-martin-shkreli [https://perma.cc/DTA3-U9SU]. 
 123. Betz, supra note 110. 
 124. Alex Kacik, Civica Rx Aims to Stabilize Fragile Pharmaceutical Supply Chain, 49(3) MOD. 
HEALTHCARE (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20190119/NEWS/
190119931/civica-rx-aims-to-stabilize-fragile-pharmaceutical-supply-chain [https://perma.cc
/48YH-WLZD]. 
 125. Blue Cross Blue Shield Press Release, supra note 107. 
 126. See Sarpatwari, Brown & Kesselheim, supra note 88, at 226. 
 127. MEDICINES PATENT POOL, https://medicinespatentpool.org/ [https://perma.cc/BJY9-
P5ZG]. 
 128. See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, Patent Pools and Antitrust – A 
Comparative Analysis (March 2014), https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM24-4WSY]. 
 129.See David B. Resnik, A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 3 J. 
PHIL. SCI. & L. 1, 13–14 (2003). 
25
Hong et al.: Transformative Models to Promote Prescription Drug Innovation and
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
TRANSFORMATIVE MODELS 
81 
Public manufacturers dedicated to supplying generic drugs will likely need to 
focus on drugs with expired patents and regulatory exclusivities to avoid costly 
litigation over intellectual property controlled by private manufacturers. Another 
intellectual property strategy for nonprofits is to leverage the investment that 
private sector companies have already made by recycling off-patent drugs for 
novel indications or accepting patent donations from pharmaceutical companies.130 
7. Funding Sources 
In its initial stages, nonprofit manufacturing may have to rely on philanthropic 
and charitable donations, in addition to advanced purchases from health care 
organizations.131 For example, the launch of Civica Rx was made possible by three 
philanthropic organizations (the Laura and John Arnold Foundation [now Arnold 
Ventures], the Peterson Center on Healthcare, and the Gary and Mary West 
Foundation) and advance donations from health care institutions.132 A government-
run operation would likely require resources from health care budgets or other 
funding mechanisms, such as fees imposed on payers. The continued operation and 
manufacturing of drugs can be sustained by revenues from sales. The goal should 
be for the public manufacturer to become financially self-sufficient through its 
products.133 
B. Outcomes from Public Manufacturing Models 
Given the limited number of nonprofit and government drug manufacturers, 
the empirical literature evaluating the effectiveness of public manufacturing 
models is sparse. However, case studies suggest that public manufacturing can 
beneficially supplement the current pharmaceutical system. The Civica Rx 
nonprofit is the leading example, with 18 medications in production, including 
vancomycin, diazepam, fentanyl, ketamine, ondansetron, midazolam, and 
naloxone,134 and a substantial consumer base of more than 1,200 hospitals.135 
Nonprofit development companies have also experienced success. Genethon 
has produced several gene therapy programs that it has since licensed to 
biotechnology companies. With increasing dedication to internalize its operations, 
its primary sponsors established a firm called YoosKesi to help obtain regulatory 
approval for its products and ensure its independence, thus replacing the need for 
 
 130. Hale, Woo & Lipton, supra note 100, at 1059. 
 131. Liljenquist, Bai & Anderson, supra note 85, at 1858. 
 132. Kodjak, supra note 95. 
 133. Conti, Meltzer & Ratain, supra note 110, at 4. 
 134. See id. 
 135. CIVICA RX, https://civicarx.org/ [https://perma.cc/28PD-8EV7]. 
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a licensing partner in the private sector.136 An adjacent example in the medical 
device space is the Alfred Mann Foundation, a nonprofit focused on developing 
technologies for movement disorders, diabetes, limb loss, and pain.137 The 
Foundation’s incubator program has resulted in a robust portfolio of new 
companies commercializing these technologies.138 These examples show that drug 
development can be successfully accomplished at cost levels far below what is 
generally offered by the pharmaceutical industry. 
The Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act was the first proposed federal 
legislation calling for a government manufacturer of generic products.139 Since it 
did not emerge from committee when it was first introduced in 2018, it was re-
introduced in January 2020 by Senator Elizabeth Warren in an amended version 
that specifically directs the government manufacture certain key products, like 
naloxone, insulin, and antibiotics.140 The bill is designed to be a fix rather than a 
replacement for the pharmaceutical industry. However, critics have expressed 
concerns that a government agency overseen by the Department of Health and 
Human Services would have neither the resources nor expertise to manufacture 
cost-effective generic drugs in competition with established private generic 
manufacturers.141 Other commentators suggest that efforts should be spent on other 
solutions to fix issues in the generics market, including more rigorous antitrust 
legislation or streamlined approval pathways for generics.142 But with a growing 
number of crises related to generic drug availability and cost, government and 
nonprofit manufacturing may be a prudent solution. 
C. Conclusions and Recommendations 
As the number of public manufacturers continues to grow, data from these 
experiences are needed to gauge achievements and identify areas of improvement 
and how well they operate in conjunction with other policy and structural changes 
to the broader pharmaceutical system. Key inquiries to guide future development 
of these models include: 
 Aligning on outcome indicators (e.g., price, access) and methods of 
evaluation for performance-based assessments. 
 
 136. Jarosławski & Toumi, supra note 88, at 2. 
 137. ALFRED MANN FOUNDATION, https://aemf.org/ [https://perma.cc/3375-DGSN]. 
 138. See id. 
 139. ADM Act, supra note 109109. 
 140. Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act of 2020, S.3162, 116th Cong. (2020). 
 141. Avik Roy, Should the Federal Government Manufacture Generic Drugs?, FREOPP (Dec. 
19, 2018), https://freopp.org/should-the-federal-government-manufacture-generic-drugs-
99520f3821d7 [https://perma.cc/WNK3-BB6E]. 
 142. Mark Terry, Point-Counterpoint: Senator Warren’s Generic Drug Proposal, BIOSPACE 
(Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.biospace.com/article/senator-warren-proposes-government-
manufacture-of-generic-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/G6BH-WLG5]. 
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 Conducting qualitative surveys of payers and stakeholders in the 
pharmaceutical industry to better understand and predict private sector 
perspectives or reactions. 
 Modeling the viability of various manufacturing models (e.g., internalized 
processes vs. outsourcing) to ensure sustainability. 
Public manufacturers will be distinctive in the current pharmaceutical market 
if they adhere to the mission of providing affordable and accessible drugs. This 
will require the appropriate governance, intellectual property, and incentive 
frameworks. Nonprofit and state-run entities must not turn into early-stage drug 
candidate developers for later investment by private sector companies. To protect 
against industry capture, governance of public manufacturing entities must be 
designed with clear objectives, transparency, and public participation in mind. The 
Democracy Collaborative proposal suggests creating public entities at the state or 
municipal level with two-tiered agency structures: one governing body and one 
operating body set up as a public trust.143 This setup would provide public 
manufacturers insulation from political influence and create opportunities for 
public engagement. The proposal also recommends oversight boards comprised of 
different stakeholders (e.g., elected representatives, patient advocates) to ensure 
accountability. Public manufacturers must also maintain flexibility in their drug 
portfolio strategies to adapt to evolving patient and market needs. Finally, 
significant resources may need to be deployed for public manufacturing of 
increasingly complex drugs, including biologics. 
 







Establishes an Office of Drug Manufacturing within the 
Department of Health and Human Services, charged with 
lowering prices, increasing competition, and addressing 
shortages in the market of prescription drugs. Authorizes 
the Office to manufacture or contract out the manufacture 
of generic drugs under certain conditions. 
 
 143. See Dana Brown, Medicine for All: The Case for a Public Option in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, THE DEMOCRACY COLLABORATIVE (Sept. 2019), https://thenextsystem.org /medicineforall 
[https://perma.cc/56D2-A6V4]. 
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Proposes a national public pharmaceutical research and 
development institute for full-cycle drug development with 
a commitment “to contributing to safe, adequate, and 
accessible supply of essential medicines in the US; to 
maximum transparency; and to management in the public 
interest.” 
 
TABLE 4: SELECTED IMPLEMENTED PUBLIC MANUFACTURING MODELS 
 
Model Description 
Civica Rx A nonprofit pharmaceutical company formed by a coalition 
of health care organizations that aims to manufacture 
hospital-administered generic drugs, specifically those in 
short supply. Funded by several philanthropic organizations 
and more than 800 US hospitals. 
Genethon A nonprofit research and development organization with 
mission to “design gene therapy products for rare diseases 
and to ensure their pre-clinical and clinical development in 
order to provide patients with access to these innovative 
treatments.” Historically, it has sought partnerships with 
biotechnology companies (e.g., AveXis, Bluebird Bio, 
Orchard Therapeutics) for clinical development and 
marketing of its products. Recently, it has increased focused 
on in-house production and distribution to maintain control 




A nonprofit pharmaceutical company that aims to develop 
and manufacture a low-cost generic alternative for Narcan 
(naloxone). The nonprofit is primarily funded by a $3.42 




The first nonprofit pharmaceutical company in the US (now 
the drug development affiliate of PATH, a global health 
organization). Launched several successful drug 
development projects for diseases that included diarrheal 
disease, malaria, and visceral leishmaniasis. 
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III. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP MODEL 
A public-private partnership (PPP) entails “a long-term contract between a 
private party and a [public entity], for providing a public asset or service, in which 
the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility.”144 By 
combining the technical knowledge and management skills of private enterprise 
with the social accountability of public actors, PPPs are intended to serve as an 
efficient means of meeting societal needs. 
As with all collaborations, a key challenge facing PPPs is achieving alignment 
between partnering parties.145 Collaborators must agree on intended aims, 
timelines, and contractual terms, which can cause delay. For example, a survey of 
academic investigators found that contract negotiations were a primary barrier to 
collaboration with the pharmaceutical industry.146 
Another challenge is risk management. Information and resource asymmetries 
exist between organizations, which may lead to inappropriate distribution of risk 
among involved parties.147 The suitable division of responsibilities and liabilities 
in a collaboration is particularly important for long-term research projects 
spanning multiple years or decades. 
A. Characteristics of Public-Private Partnership Models 
The number of biomedical PPPs has increased dramatically in recent years.148 
The leading US convener of such partnerships is the Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority (BARDA), a federal body created in 2006 
to prepare society with biodefense and pandemic tools.149 BARDA-organized PPPs 
have contributed to the development of more than 50 FDA-approved products 
addressing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.150 Around the 
 
 144. Public-Private Partnerships – Reference Guide Version 1.0, WORLD BANK INST. 1, 11 
(2012). 
 145. Oktay Yildirim et al., Opportunities and Challenges for Drug Development: Public-
Private Partnerships, Adaptive Designs and Big Data, 7 FRONTIERS IN PHARMACOLOGY 1, 5 (2016). 
 146. Marjan Amiri & Martin C. Michel, Expectations and Satisfaction of Academic 
Investigators in Nonclinical Collaboration with the Pharmaceutical Industry, 388 NAUNYN-
SCHMIEDEBERG’S ARCH. PHARMACOLOGY 613, 613 (2015). 
 147. Jens K. Roehrich, Michael A. Lewis & Gerard George, Are Public-Private Partnerships a 
Healthy Option? A Systematic Literature Review, 113 SOC. SCI. & MED.110, 114 (2014). 
 148. See Build and Beyond: The (r)evolution of Healthcare PPPs, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 
(2010), https://www.pwc.se/sv/halso-sjukvard/assets/build-and-beyond-the-revolution-of-
healthcare-ppps.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SVA-MMVY]. 
 149. BARDA STRATEGIC PLAN 2011 – 2016, BARDA (2011), 
https://www.phe.gov/about/barda/Documents/barda-strategic-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/75UB-
7VAD]. 
 150. Kimberly Buckmon, The Power of Partnership: BARDA Ushers in 50th FDA-Approved 
Product for Health Security, ASPR BLOG (Oct. 10, 2019), 
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same time BARDA was established, various nonprofit organizations formed PPPs 
to spur research and development efforts for select diseases, especially those 
disproportionately affecting developing countries.151 These PPPs differ in scope, 
duration, and structure but all share a common goal of efficient drug development 
by relying on a bidirectional exchange of resources and expertise.152 
1. Participants 
PPPs are formed by partnerships spanning three sectors: government, 
industry, and civil society.153 PPPs often originate from the government, including 
the Medicines for Malaria Venture, which launched with funding from several 
European countries.154 However, civil society organizations also play a critical 
role, given their awareness of unmet needs and access to patient networks. For 
example, the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi), originated from a 
working group organized by the nonprofit Médecins Sans Frontières.155 
2. Scope 
Some PPPs are simple collaborations between one company and a specific 
group of researchers. Others involve strategic alliances between one company and 
an entire academic institution.156 A few are expansive multi-stakeholder consortia 
involving numerous organizations spanning multiple sectors. For example, with an 
annual budget of more than €5 billion, the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) 
oversees several smaller consortia that have distinct missions and fields more than 
120 projects (Table 5).157 
 
https://www.phe.gov/ASPRBlog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=362 [https://perma.cc/W7AP-53F5]. 
 151. Chan Harjivan & George Dougherty, Drug Development for Government, Nonprofit, and 
Developing-World Markets, 7 PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. SOURCING AND MGMT. (2011). 
 152. Importantly, some programs may fall under both the public manufacturing and PPP 
models. For example, Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi) is a nonprofit manufacturer 
(i.e., public manufacturing model) that engages in public-private partnerships (i.e., PPP model) to 
develop treatments. 
 153. Remco L. A. de Vrueh & Daan J. A. Crommelin, Reflections on the Future of 
Pharmaceutical Public-Private Partnerships: From Input to Impact, 34 PHARMACEUTICAL RES. 
1985, 1990 (2017). 
 154. DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, https://www.dndi.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/4TLF-YV8F]; MEDICINES FOR MALARIA VENTURE, https://www.mmv.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/S9VW-MV4W]. 
 155. History, DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, https://www.dndi.org/about-
dndi/history/ [https://perma.cc/V6BV-CQ7R]. 
 156. Yildirim et al., supra note 145, at 4. 
 157. Elisabetta Vaudano, The Innovative Medicines Initiative: A Public Private Partnership 
Model to Foster Drug Discovery, 6 COMPUTATIONAL AND STRUCTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY J. (2013); 
Matthias Gottwald et al., Public–Private Partnerships in Lead Discovery: Overview and Case 
Studies, 349(9) ARCHIV DER PHARMAZIE 692, 695 (2016). 
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3. Intended Purpose 
There are three broad categories of biomedical PPPs: access PPPs, 
precompetitive PPPs, and product development PPPs.158 Access PPPs focus on 
promoting availability of drugs in developing countries, typically by overcoming 
obstacles in distribution systems.159 
Precompetitive PPPs generate foundational scientific concepts and 
infrastructure to advance drug development. They aim to reduce the risk of late-
stage development failures, resulting in outputs such as research tools, platform 
technologies, shared databases, and predictive models. As their name implies, 
precompetitive PPPs do not directly compete with pharmaceutical companies, but 
rather supply insights that pharmaceutical manufacturers would take up in 
developing their own products.160 
The IMI consortia are one prominent example of precompetitive PPPs. Their 
research goals are proposed by pharmaceutical companies, which helps ensure that 
projects will have an impact on the industry.161 The output of these consortia can 
be grouped into five broad categories: validated models for drug development, 
approaches to predict adverse drug effects, compilated data from various sources 
for novel analysis, standards for drug development, and approaches for more 
efficient patient enrollment in clinical trials.162 Other consortia dedicated to 
specific disease areas, such as diabetes (SUMMIT) or severe asthma (U-
BIOPRED), are limited to precompetitive efforts like biomarker identification and 
disease understanding. 
Finally, product development PPPs identify and guide specific drug 
candidates through clinical trials for eventual regulatory approval and market 
launch.163 Government and nonprofit institutions are motivated to participate in 
these PPPs because they gain the opportunity to “set the directions for innovation 
aimed at key public health milestones,”164 while private sector innovators benefit 
from access to foundational research and relationships with key experts. 
 
 158. Roy Widdus, Public-Private Partnerships: An Overview, 99 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 
TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE S1, S5 (2005). 
 159. de Vrueh & Crommelin, supra note 153, at 1987. 
 160. Gottwald et al., supra note 157, at 694. 
 161. Id. at 693. 
 162. Hugh Laverty, Magda Gunn & Michel Goldman, Improving R&D Productivity of 
Pharmaceutical Companies Through Public–Private Partnership: Experiences from the Innovative 
Medicines Initiative, 12 EXPERT REV. PHARMACOECONOMICS & OUTCOMES RES. 545, 546 (2012). 
 163. Widdus, supra note 158, at S5. 
 164. Mariana Mazzucato et al., The People’s Prescription: Re-imagining Health Innovation to 
Deliver Public Value, UCL INST. FOR INNOVATION AND PUB. PURPOSE 1, 7 (2018). 
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4. Intellectual Property 
Intellectual property frameworks associated with PPPs affect downstream 
product marketing and access. Stevens et al. distinguished three such frameworks: 
partnership-focused, open collaboration, and hybrid.165 In partnership-focused 
frameworks, rights to new knowledge and technology arising from PPPs 
(“foreground intellectual property”) are carefully negotiated among the various 
partners. Such frameworks are typically used in product development PPPs, for 
which intellectual property ownership of the final product is highly important. By 
contrast, open collaboration frameworks allow data sharing in the public domain. 
In the middle are hybrid frameworks, which are tailored to individual PPPs, but 
generally limit only some foreground intellectual property rights. 
Precompetitive PPPs often employ open collaboration frameworks. For 
example, the Structural Genomics Consortium requires all results be placed in a 
public domain without restriction,166 while the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging 
Initiative hosts its research on an open database, which has been cited by 750 
publications.167 Yet despite the open collaborative framework of many IMI 
consortia, several academic partners have criticized IMI for intellectual property 
policies that favor the private sector’s financial interests.168 Academic partners 
have specifically decried ambiguous intellectual property policies that allow 
pharmaceutical industry partners to exploit technology developed as part of a 
research project, without having to obtain consent from other consortium 
partners.169 Intellectual property frameworks and policies are therefore important 
to determine clearly upfront during the formation of PPPs to ensure transparency 
and trust among partners. 
5. Relationship with Regulatory Authorities 
Many PPPs have been set up to communicate with regulatory authorities in 
the early stages of drug candidate development. These PPPs can serve as 
knowledge platforms that allow regulatory authorities to better understand not only 
new disease evaluation tools, but also academic and industry stakeholder 
 
 165. Hilde Stevens et al., Intellectual Property Policies in Early-Phase Research in Public–
Private Partnerships, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 504 (2016). 
 166. Gottwald et al., supra note 158, at 694. 
 167. Michael W. Weiner et al., The Alzheimer’s Disease Neufroimaging Initiative: A Review of 
Papers Published Since Its Inception, 9 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA e111 (2013). 
 168. Gunjan Sinha, Spat Over IMI Funding and Intellectual Property, 29 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 473, 473 (2011). 
 169. See id. (quoting Michael Browne, Head of European Research and Development at 
University College, London: “The wording of the IP policy is ambiguous” such that academic 
institutions “get short shrift from both ends.”). 
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perspectives.170 One prominent example is the Critical Path Initiative, which the 
FDA launched in 2004 to create new evaluation tools and standards for clinical 
trials. The Critical Path Initiative has since formed several consortia, including the 
Predictive Safety Testing Consortium (identifying safety biomarkers), Patient-
Reported Outcome Consortium (evaluating patient-reported outcome 
instruments), and the Critical Path for Alzheimer’s Disease (improving 
development process for treatments of neurodegenerative disorders), which have 
contributed to changing regulatory approaches and frameworks related to these 
diseases and concepts.171 
6. Funding Sources 
Funding sources for PPPs include grants, fees from participating member 
organizations, and donations from private foundations. Contributions are often 
split among partners. For example, 50% of research funding for the Netherlands’ 
Technology Top Institute comes from the government and 25% each from public 
and private partners.172 
B. Outcomes from Public-Private Partnership Models 
Comparative outcome assessments for PPPs are difficult to conduct as PPPs 
differ widely in purpose, number of participants, and financial budgets. 
Furthermore, appropriate outcome indicators are not well-established in the 
literature. A previous study revealed that only 2 out of a total of 12 suggested 
indicators of outcome for PPPs were considered measurable by experts.173 
A value assessment framework by de Vrueh et al. suggested classifying 
outcome indicators for biomedical PPPs into five categories: networks and 
collaboration, research activity and knowledge, knowledge sharing and 
dissemination, human capital, and financials and operations.174 This framework 
was applied to analyze four PPPs of varying size, location, and research focus: the 
Structural Genomics Consortium, the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging 
Initiative, the Top Institute Pharma, and the IMI. The investigators concluded that 
the review “provide[s] clear evidence that precompetitive biomedical PPPs have 
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started to generate tangible outcomes.”175 However, the study acknowledged that 
“multi-indicator, multi-method” approaches involving quantitative and qualitative 
analyses would be necessary in future evaluations of PPPs given the complex 
interactions between multiple stakeholders.176 
In 2016, the IMI appointed an expert group to conduct a socio-economic 
impact assessment of nine IMI consortia.177 The group created an impact 
assessment model “to capture the complexities of actual practice but remain simple 
enough to be useful for empirical analysis and clarification of observed 
phenomena.”178 This model involved three steps. First, the position of the PPP in 
the innovation system was identified (e.g., preclinical research, training, clinical 
development). Second, quantitative mediators and intermediate outcomes were 
characterized, including number of scientific publications, patents, licenses, 
databases, products, and trained personnel. Finally, socio-economic impact was 
assessed based on factors such as development time and costs, health benefits, new 
businesses, sales, and employment. The report summarized quantitative outputs 
for several ongoing IMI projects, highlighting the areas in which socio-economic 
impact had not yet been realized. The advantage of IMI’s impact assessment model 
is its ability to compare quantitative outputs and socio-economic factors at various 
stages of implementation. A similar impact assessment applied to PPPs outside of 
IMI consortia, including initiatives such as BARDA and the Critical Path Initiative, 
is needed. 
Select PPPs have been successful in developing and commercializing novel 
treatments. For example, since 2003, DNDi has spearheaded the development of 7 
new treatments targeted at various neglected diseases, including malaria, Chagas 
disease, leishmaniasis, and pediatric HIV.179 The organization expects to develop 
16 to 18 new treatments by 2023.180 
However, a common criticism of PPPs is they often lack safeguards to ensure 
reasonable pricing of the products they produce. For example, a BARDA program 
came under scrutiny for transferring a license to its Zika vaccine to Sanofi without 
affordable access conditions.181 BARDA subsequently partnered with Takeda 
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Pharmaceutical, awarding the company an initial contract of $19.8 million for Zika 
vaccine development through phase I testing and potential funding up to $312 
million for later-stage development,182 again without price guarantees. Control of 
drug pricing and marketing has often rested with the private partner due to the 
public entity’s inability or unwillingness to implement or enforce an affordable 
price. Some public authorities have stated that exclusive licenses—absent price 
controls—are necessary for industry partners to invest in commercializing 
federally developed drugs.183 
C. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Of the three PPP models discussed in this review, precompetitive PPPs are the 
most prevalent and most studied. As the number of PPPs continue to grow, 
additional research is needed to understand their successes and failures as well as 
steps in the drug development process in which they could play a greater role. Next 
steps should include: 
 Identifying “bottleneck” areas of drug development or other issue areas 
best targeted by PPP models. 
 Establishing broad consensus on output indicators to assess and track 
research project achievements and failures. 
 Exploring various IP frameworks to implement in PPP contracts to ensure 
increased access to drugs upon successful development. 
Early collaboration between private and public stakeholders has a positive 
influence in shaping the direction of drug development. PPPs are a proven method 
to facilitate this collaboration, having resulted in significant innovation. However, 
most PPPs continue to operate within the existing system that allows private 
pharmaceutical companies to retain patent-based monopolies, which can lead to 
high prices and suboptimal access. Reforms related to intellectual property rights 
associated with PPP models are necessary to prevent this outcome. Specifically, 
exclusive licenses granted to private partners should be discouraged. Any such 
licenses that are executed should include provisions designed to safeguard public 
interest, such as price controls, limits to the scope of exclusivity, or reductions to 
the years of exclusivity. 
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A collaboration between leading Alzheimer research 
centers, the National Institute on Aging, 13 pharmaceutical 
companies, and nonprofit foundations to identify, validate, 
and standardize disease biomarkers for use in clinical trials. 
Its core project is a multi-site, longitudinal clinical study 
tracking cognitive impairment and early Alzheimer’s 








The office within Department of Human and Health 
Services that procures and develops medical 
countermeasures against health threats to the US 
population. Partners with private biopharmaceutical 
companies to develop and stockpile vaccines and 
treatments for public health emergencies. Between 2007 
and 2017, BARDA stockpiled 21 products and invested 
more than $2.5 billion in advanced research and 
development of medical countermeasures. 
Critical Path 
Initiative (CPI) 
An independent organization focused on reducing the time, 
cost, and risk of drug development and regulatory review. 
Formed several PPP consortia under its umbrella, including 
the Predictive Safety Testing Consortium (identifying 
safety biomarkers), Patient-Reported Outcome Consortium 
(evaluating patient-reported outcome instruments), and the 
Critical Path for Alzheimer's Disease (improving 







A public-private partnership established to develop drugs 
for disease neglected by industry, including sleeping 
sickness, Chagas disease, leishmaniasis, filaria, and later 
pediatric HIV/AIDS. The partnership relies on 50% public 
and 50% private contributions to fund research and 
development, has developed six new treatments since its 
inception, and expects to develop 10 to 12 additional new 
treatments by 2023. 
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eTOX An IMI consortium of 13 pharmaceutical companies, 11 
academic or nonprofit organizations, and 6 small and mid-
sized enterprises dedicated to advancing predictive models 
of in vivo toxicology of novel drugs. The consortium 
created the largest database of preclinical safety data, with 
access to more than 7,000 systemic toxicity data sets 
corresponding to more than 1,800 compounds.  
European Lead 
Factory (ELF) 
An IMI consortium of 7 European companies, 13 public 
companies, and 10 small and mid-sized enterprises aimed 
at creating a pooled, diverse library of 500,000 compounds 





A multi-consortia collaboration between the European 
pharmaceutical industry and the European Commission 
that implements and coordinates projects aimed at 
developing new tools and methods for drug development 
and improving data management. IMI projects have 
collectively identified over 460 biomarker candidates and 
over 20 new drug targets, in addition to developing over 50 







An IMI consortium aimed at improving beta-cell function 
and identification of diagnostic biomarkers for treatment 
monitoring in diabetes. The consortium generated and 
commercially developed the first fully functional human 
beta cell line suitable for drug research, now used by 





An IMI consortium of 7 pharmaceutical companies, 9 
public partners, and 4 small- and moderate-sized entities to 
enable the adoption of drug-target binding kinetics analysis 
in the drug discovery process and to improve prediction of 
binding kinetics to drug effect. Data generated by the 
consortium are integrated into a publicly accessible 
database.  
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A drug development venture devoted to discovery, 
development, and distribution of new antimalarial drugs. 
Partnering pharmaceutical companies include 
GlaxoSmithKline (to identify new drug leads) and 
Ranbaxy (to guide an antimalaria candidate through 
clinical trials).  
NEWMEDS An IMI consortium focused on developing new animal 
models that use brain recording and behavioral tests to 
identify innovative and effective drugs for schizophrenia. 
The consortium evaluated the impact of copy number 
variations conferring risk of schizophrenia by phenotyping 
more than 1,300 subjects carrying certain mutations.  
SAFE-T An IMI consortium creating sensitive and specific tests to 
diagnose and monitor drug-induced injury to the kidney, 
liver, and vascular systems. The consortium evaluated 153 






An IMI consortium of nonprofit researchers in 
collaboration with industry partners, focused on advancing 
structural biology. The consortium is committed to placing 
all data and research information into the public domain 
without restrictions and has published more than 2,000 
novel protein structures and 40 chemical probes. 
SUMMIT An IMI consortium aimed at developing new biomarkers, 
imaging techniques, and animal models to advance drug 
development in diabetes. The consortium generated the 
largest GWAS data collection of over 26,000 cases of Type 





A public-private partnership aimed at building 
pharmaceutical research and development networks in five 
disease areas (autoimmune diseases, cardiovascular 
disease, cancer, infectious disease, and brain diseases). The 
partnership has resulted in 470 trained PhD and 
postdoctoral fellows, 750 publications, 41 lead compounds, 
18 novel formulations, 11 biomarkers, 33 preclinical 
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models, 28 clinical models, 11 research databases, and 87 
research tools. 
U-BIOPRED An IMI consortium aimed at using information and 
samples from adults and children with severe asthma to 
understand more about the disease to aid in drug 
development. The consortium recruited a large clinical 
cohort of severe asthma patients: 1,025 adult and pediatric 
subjects were assessed at 14 clinical centers across Europe. 
CONCLUSION 
While lucrative to manufacturers, the current pharmaceutical innovation 
system does not incentivize the development of drugs of greatest patient or public 
health need and has led to pricing that patients and health care systems cannot 
afford. Delinkage, public manufacturing, and PPPs have been proposed as 
alternative models to address these shortcomings. Each model exhibits promise 
and can be meaningfully advanced in the short-term in several ways. For example, 
economic modeling of prize sizes necessary to induce manufacturers and of the 
budgetary impact of such prizes could convince government payers to fund 
delinkage pilots in discrete areas of market failure. Critical appraisal of the 
outcomes of existing public manufacturing models could inform their optimization 
and possible expansion. Finally, changes to intellectual property frameworks 
governing current product development PPPs could increase patient access to 
therapies emerging from such schemes. Timely investment in the resources 
necessary to perform such steps would likely reap large dividends. 
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